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A measurement for how similar (or distant) two computer programs are has a wide range
of possible applications. For example, they can be applied to malware analysis or analysis
of university students’ programming exercises. However, as programs may be arbitrarily
structured, capturing the similarity of two non-trivial programs is a complex task. By
extracting call graphs (graphs of caller-callee relationships of the program’s functions, where
nodes denote functions and directed edges denote function calls) from the programs, the
similarity measurement can be changed into a graph problem.
Previously, static call graph distance measures have been largely based on graph matching
techniques, e.g. graph edit distance or maximum common subgraph, which are known to
be costly. We propose a call graph distance measure based on features that preserve some
structural information from the call graph without explicitly matching user defined functions
together. We define basic properties of the features, several ways to compute the feature
values, and give a basic algorithm for generating the features.
We evaluate our features using two small datasets: a dataset of malware variants, and a
dataset of university students’ programming exercises, focusing especially on the former. For
our evaluation we use experiments in information retrieval and clustering. We compare our
results for both datasets to a baseline, and additionally for the malware dataset to the results
obtained with a graph edit distance approximation.
In our preliminary results we show that even though the feature generation approach is
simpler than the graph edit distance approximation, the generated features can perform on
a similar level as the graph edit distance approximation. However, experiments on larger
datasets are still required to verify the results.
ACM Computing Classification System (CCS):
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• Information systems~Clustering and classification
• Security and privacy~Intrusion/anomaly detection and malware mitigation
• Theory of computation~Program analysis
• Software and its engineering~Software evolution
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1 Introduction
Trying to determine the function of a piece of software from its executable by
other means than running the program is a hard task. Even deciding whether the
program will come to a stop, or halt, is undecidable. Analysing the behavior of
programs is still needed in, for example, malware1 detection.
The history of large scale malware is approximately 30 years old; although, the
Cambrian explosion of malware triggered only after the use of internet spread.
The term, computer virus, was introduced by Frederick Cohen in 1984 (see [7]),
and the first MS-DOS virus, Brain, was detected in 1986. However, the definition
of the computer viruses is not entirely agreed upon; hence, the identity of the first
program to carry the name has been exposed to debate in the history of computer
security [10].
The first viruses until the mid-80’s were largely self-replicating exploits, which
did no further harm – excluding the consumption of disc space – to the compromised
systems. Afterwards, the evolution of the viruses and other malware has taken a
path from damaging boot sector viruses, such as Michelangelo, through e-mail
worms and Trojan horses, that bloomed in the late 90’s and early 00’s, to high
profile software – e.g., botnets – that are nearly entirely spread for commercial
purposes. In the few recent years, malware tailored to the spesific purposes by the
military or national agencies has been exposed.
Malware evolution can be generally seen as a two-step race where both steps
are carried simultaneously. In the first step, the malware publishing groups and
individuals modify the existing malware, and test them against various cutting
edge anti-virus programs until the programs don’t recognize the malware anymore.
In the second step, anti-virus software groups and companies collect new malware
samples and adjust their software to detect them. As the time goes by, also
entirely new malware families are created. The new exploits may target previously
unknown zero-day vulnerabilities, or existing holes in the security. Thus, the face
of the malware detection is ever changing; for example, mobile malware families
were said to increase 58% from 2011 to 2012 [34].
The continuously evolving field makes similarity analysis of different malware
instances a key point in recognizing the variations of already known malware
families, and in detecting the new and unseen exploits. The enhanced detection
helps private parties and companies by providing better anti-virus software,
1Malware is a general term for various kinds of hostile or intrusive software such as viruses,
worms, Trojan horses, ransomware, rootkits, keyloggers, spyware and other malicious programs.
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and efficient classification and clustering aids the analysts in anti-virus software
companies to perform justified decisions of the relations between different malware
families and variants.
As malware publishers can use tools, such as Mistfall, Win32/Smile and RPME
[35], to automatise code obfuscation, it is important to handle similarity analysis in
a way that is as resistant as possible to such methods. Therefore, the first proposed
methods that compute similarities or edit distances between operational code
(opcode) sequences are too unstable as even substantial changes in the code may
not change the actual functionality of the program.
A plenty of different approaches have been proposed for more robust malware
detection and classification. They can be coarcely divided into two groups:
dynamic (behavioral) and static analysis. Dynamic analysis of a malware binary is
performed by running the malware in a so called sandbox environment and data
from the run is collected in some form; typically as a feature vector or as snapshots
of the system states before and after the run. In static analysis, malware binary is
disassembled with a dissambler, e.g. IDA Pro [9]. Disassembling yields a dissection
of the binary’s inner structures, such as function caller-callee relationships. The
drawback of the dynamic analysis is that the data is only captured from one run
and may not represent all of the possible behavioral traits. On the other hand, the
static analysis may not be able to interpret all of the code’s inner structure, thus
yielding only partial or even false information.
The caller-callee relationships acquired by the static analysis can be used to
create a call graph of the malware. A call graph of a binary is a directed graph
where vertices represent local and non-local functions and edges represent calls
between functions.
The call graphs serve as a useful higher abstraction of the program binaries.
They are not so prone to simple opcode switching techniques, although they can
be relatively easily distorted, e.g. by refactoring a local function into two different
functions, where the two functions combined have exactly the same behavior as
the non-refactored function.
In most of the works on malware analysis using call graphs, the similarity
measure between malware variants is acquired either by using graph edit distance
(GED) estimation, maximum common subgraphs or function matching. However,
these techniques are still quite vulnerable to code obfuscation techniques that
heavily alter the call graph’s structure without altering the functionality of the
software.
Trying to capitalize on this notion, we choose a structurally oriented feature
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approach in this thesis. To compute a distance between call graphs, we do not
try to explicitly match local functions between different programs. Instead, we
consider as features the sets of k non-local functions. The non-local functions must
be linked together by a call structure where there exists a local function root, such
that each non-local function is at most dth successor of the root. We generate these
feature sets from both call graphs, and the distance between the call graphs is then
computed to be the distance between the feature sets.
The used distance measure is not limited to the malware analysis, and is, of
course, applicable to programs of various kinds. One such task is to analyse how
similar programming exercises are. Measuring the distance between the returned
exercises can reveal common higher level structures in the exercise solutions, or in
extreme cases may even give a hint of plagiarism[15].
We evaluate our features with two datasets: a malware dataset consisting of
193 variants in 24 different familities, and a student dataset consisting of a total
number of 366 exercises returned for five different exercise assignments. In our
experiments we use retrieval tasks and clustering to analyse how well the proposed
features perform. In addition, the proposed features are compared against results
obtained with GED approximation for the malware dataset.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. First, previous related work
in the field is reviewed. Then, basics of graphs and call graphs are explained.
After different graph related properties, the graph features and in particular the
proposed d-reachable k-gram features are discussed, and an attempt to analyse and
define what makes a good call graph feature is made. After the proposed features
are introduced, we give an overall view of the two datasets used in this thesis.
Then, the call graph features are used to perform clustering and retrieval tasks on
the two datasets and the performance of the features is evaluated. Following the
experiments is a discussion about the validity of the results, and the thesis ends
with conclusions and notions about the possible future work.
2 Related Work
In this section we will give a short overview of the work previously done in
related areas. However, before we can delve deeper, we must make a clear cut
between two different forms of malware analysis: malware detection, and malware
classification. Even though the malware domain has been studied extensively,
these terms are used vaguely or with mixed meanings in the existing literature.
The most prominent one is malware detection. In this thesis, the malware detection
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is used to specify the act of detecting when the existing malware variants infiltrate
or compromise a system. The detection is typically run by anti-virus software and
uses finger printing and/or heuristics to detect possible threats to the system. Of
course, some finger prints or heuristics may also match new malware variants, but
the methods do not separate these from the existing ones.
On the other hand, malware classification and clustering are done by anti-virus
companies analysts in order to retrieve more information of the new and existing
variants and families, and to define their relationships. However, as malware
detection is based on the work done by the analysts, the two are closely related
and the tools and techniques developed for one can often be applied to the other.
The history of malware classification is as old as the first damaging malwares.
Early work based on treating the malware binary as a sequence of operational
codes (opcode). Malware variants were detected and classified based on various
versions of opcode fingerprinting techniques (opcode sequences with various
ways to denote wildcards, etc.) [35].
The search for resilient methods to classify self-morphing and obfuscated
malware variants into new and existing strains has lead to diverse field of study
which can be roughly divided into two sections: behavioral2 and static analysis.
Although, in many occasions static and behavioral techniques are combined into
hybrid methods for a more complete approach.
Behavioral analysis runs malware variants in a so called sandbox environment
and collects information by monitoring run-time system calls. This information
can then be used, e.g. to create a feature vector which is compared against vectors
acquired from other variants.
Using call graphs acquired via static analysis to examine similarities in benign
or malware binaries is another popular approach. Techniques revolving around call
graphs can be generally divided into three closely related, but distinct approaches:
finding maximum common subgraphs (MCS), finding graph edit distances (GED)
[31], and finding vertex or edge matchings between the call graphs based on local
neighborhoods.
Carrera and Erdélyi [6] developed a python package (IDAPython) for easy
extraction of call graphs from IDA Pro [9]. Similarity between call graphs is based
on function matching where local functions are matched based on their call-tree
signature, which is a binary vector expressing called non-local functions, and
control flow graph (CFG) signatures; the list of edges connecting basic blocks in
function’s CFG. The method is evaluated using several small case studies, and
2behavioral and dynamic analysis are used interchangeably in this thesis
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constructing a phylogenetic tree from the whole dataset.
Briones and Gomez [4] continue the work done by Carrera and Erdélyi [6], and
modify their function matching and similarity metric. For each local function, a
signature is computed from the sequence of its opcodes and used for fast local
function matching. Furthermore, the CFG signatures are altered to contain number
of basic blocks, number of edges and number of subcalls.
Park et al. [25] use behavioral call graphs and define a similarity metric based
on maximal common subgraphs (MCS). The similarity between two graphs is
derived from the number of nodes in the MCS divided by the number of nodes
on the larger call graph. They evaluate their method with 300 malware variants
(6 families each consisting of 50 samples) and 80 benign executables, and obtain
tentatively promising results.
The first large scale work which utilizes GED approximation to call graphs
in malware classification was done by Hu et al. [12] . The GED approximation
used is a bipartite graph matching proposed in [26, 27], which is further optimized.
Bipartite graph matching uses the Hungarian algorithm originally proposed by
Kuhn [20]. Fundamentally, Hu et al. construct the whole system to store and query
malware in a two-layered hierarchical database to efficiently index the malware
and therefore accelerate the queries to database. Both of the layers are trees, where
the second layer resides in the first layer’s leaf nodes. The first layer of the database
is an altered B+ -tree which uses four very common features to index the malware
into the optimistic Vantage Point Trees (VPT) in B+ -tree’s leafs (the second layer).
The search in VPT’s is done by approximating the GED as mentioned and selecting
k-nearest neighbors to return. In effect, the approach reduces the amount of costly
GED approximations needed to produce precise query results from the whole
database.
Kinable [16] tries to find good clusterings of a call graph set consisting of 194
malware variants in 24 different families. He uses two different algorithms to
find good approximations of GED: bipartite graph matching [26, 27] and genetic
search based method. The results of his experiments suggest that genetic algorithm
takes too much time in order to reach as good results as bipartite graph matching.
Furthermore, as GED needs a cost function for different graph operations, two
different cost functions are proposed: random walk probability vectors (RWP), and
simple relabeling and local neighbourhood matching. He reaches to a conclusion
that RWP’s computational complexity does not justify the minimal gains it gives
when compared to a simple relabeling and local neighbourhood matching cost.
For clustering, he tests k-medoids, G-means and DBSCAN in order to find the
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optimal algorithm and cluster amount. Finally, a silhouette coefficient is calculated
for all DBSCAN’s density reachable parameter’s values with several minimum
cluster sizes to find the optimal parameter settings to produce the final clustering.
Kostakis et al. [18], and later Kinable and Kostakis [17], continue the work
started by Kinable in [16]. Kostakis et al. [18] improve the GED approximation
results with adapted simulated annealing algorithm, which uses opcode sequence
matching for local functions, and Kinable and Kostakis [17] use the GED approx-
imations obtained in [18] in the same experiment suite as in [16] to verify their
suitability for malware clustering.
Xu et al. [37] propose a similarity metric based on matched edges in two call
graphs. Local functions are matched by using coloring based on opcode types
present in the functions and cosine similarity of opcode type histograms.
Even though a lot of different approaches for malware similarity analysis based
on call graphs have been proposed, which are in most cases applicable to other
program’s also, there is still room for new approaches as the problem has not
been thoroughly solved by any single method. In most cases call graph similarity
measures are computationally costly, even though the analysis is accelerated by
approximation techniques. Also, the computationally costly methods have to be
done for each call graph pair separately. The approach proposed in this thesis
overcomes these problems as the feature generation is fast and can be done first
separately to all call graphs, making the actual distance computation between the
call graphs efficient because of the precomputed feature sets.
3 Background
In this section we describe the background related to our work. The information
presented here is needed in later sections, especially in Section 4 where proposed
features are discussed and in Section 5 where an algorithm for mining the proposed
features is introduced. First, basic graph notation and terminology is introduced in
Section 3.1. Then, we move on to call graphs in Section 3.2, where we discuss what
kind of properties call graphs obtained with static analysis have, and in Section 3.3
we define different similarity measures used with call graphs. The section finishes
with a short examination of code obfuscation techniques used by the malware
publishers, with an emphasis on techniques affecting call graph structures.
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3.1 Graphs
Graphs are popular in representing structured data. Next, we will give basic
definitions of unlabeled graphs, subgraphs and graph isomorphism used in this
thesis. These definitions are needed later, when call graphs and similarities
between graphs are discussed.
Definition 1 (Graph). A graph G consists of a vertex set V(G) and an edge set E(G).
Edge set E(G) is a relation between vertices, i.e. for all (u, v) ∈ E(G) if and only if
u, v ∈ V(G). For undirected graphs the relations are symmetrical: (u, v) ∈ E(G) if
and only if (v,u) ∈ E(G). Directed graphs do not have this restriction.
Definition 2 (Subgraph). Graph H is said to be a subgraph of graph G if and only
if |V(H)| ≤ |V(G)| and there exists an injective function f : V(H)→ V(G), such that
for all (u, v) ∈ E(H) if and only if ( f (u), f (v)) ∈ E(G).
Definition 3 (Graph isomorphism). A graph H is isomorphic with a graph G if
and only if |V(H)| = |V(G)| and there exists a bijective function f : V(H)→ V(G),
such that ∀(u, v) ∈ E(H) if and only if ( f (u), f (v)) ∈ E(G), i.e. both graphs are each
others subgraphs.
A simple graph can have at most one edge between two vertices, whereas
multigraphs allow several edges between vertice pairs. Unless otherwise stated,
graphs in this thesis are simple graphs; with an addition that a directed graph G
with edges (u, v), (v,u) ∈ E(G), where u, v ∈ V(G), is considered as a simple graph.
A graph can also be labeled. A labeling is a function L : S → L, where L is
a label set and S ⊆ V(G). A label set can contain any kind of objects; typical
labels are positive integers, colours or character strings. Graph is fully labeled if
S = V(G), and partially labeled if S ⊂ V(G). In many domains vertex labels are
unique, which makes it trivial to construct an unique edge labeling for simple
graphs by combining the vertice labels; this applies also for directed simple graphs
with edges oriented in both directions between vertice pairs. A small, labeled,
directed graph can be seen in Figure 1.
Edges of a graph link its vertices together: an edge (u, v) is said to connect vertices
u and v. A path in an undirected graph G is a sequence of edges (e1, e2, . . . , en),
∀ei ∈ E(G), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}, which connects a sequence of vertices (v1, v2, . . . , vn, vn+1),
where ∀vi ∈ V(G), and e j = (v j, v j+1), j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}. Similarly as in the case of a
single edge, the vertices along the path are said to be connected. The length of a
path p, len(p), is the number of edges it contains. Furthermore, we say that the
(directed) distance between the vertices u and v in a graph G is the length of the
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Figure 1: A small directed graph, with five labeled vertices and six unlabeled
edges.
shortest path, ps(u, v), between u and v in the graph G. The shortest path from
vertice to itself has zero length, len(ps(u,u)) = 0 for all u ∈ V(G). If there is no path
from u to v, then len(ps(u, v)) = ∞.
3.2 Call Graphs
In this section we introduce call graphs. We start by defining overall characteristics
of call graphs and move on to issues and matters more focused to this thesis.
A call graph of a program is a labeled directed graph, which represent the caller-
callee relationships of the program’s functions. A call graph can be constructed
either by using behavioral or static analysis. In the former case, the call graph is
obtained at runtime by analysing program’s behavior in a sandbox environment,
and in the latter, by running a disassembler on the program’s binary.
The call graphs obtained by the behavioral analysis tend to obtain only partial
information of the caller-callee relationships, since all calling routines are not
necessarily observed during a finite number of runs or a limited amount of
runtime. On the other hand, they may capture sequential control flow information,
which may prove to be essential in defining exact behavioral traits of the program.
Static analysis collects more thorough information of the program binary’s
structure, but may end up being largely redundant, e.g. in the case where several
large common libraries have been included in the binary, but very few of their
individual functions have been called. Furthermore, the static analysis tools may
be unable to decide which exact function is called from the function set, and
therefore can leave some possible call structures unnoticed.
Call graphs can be either context sensitive or context insensitive. Context sensitive
call graphs add an additional vertex for every call configuration (e.g. parameter
configuration) that is used to call the function. Context insensitive call graphs
add only one vertex for all configurations. Call graps discussed in this thesis are
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Paaohjelma:main
Tietokanta:<init>
Paaohjelma:lisaa
Tietokanta:lisaaLintu
java.util.Scanner:<init>
java.io.PrintStream:println
java.util.Scanner:nextLine
java.lang.String:equals
java.lang.Object:<init>
java.io.PrintStream:print
java.util.ArrayList:add
java.util.ArrayList:<init>
Paaohjelma:<init>
Lintu:<init>
Figure 2: An example of a small call graph extracted from a Java program. The
orange nodes with methods starting with ‘java’ are library (non-local) functions,
and the blue nodes are user defined (local) functions.
context insensitive. An example of call a graph structure can be seen in the Figure
2. Typically, extracted call graphs are heavily tree like with a root in a program’s
entry point, e.g. the main-method of a Java program’s main class. However, due
to multiple reasons (some of which are elaborated in the Section 3.4), they can
contain areas not connected by the call structure, or even singular nodes with no
incoming or outcoming calls.
The call graph’s vertice set can be divided between different kind of functions:
local (user defined), common library, external and thunk functions; the latter three
called together as non-local functions. In this thesis, only the difference between
local and non-local functions is considered. This partitioning is done because, at
compile time, the compiler can alter the names of the local functions inside the
binary, but the names of the non-local functions remain the same.
Since there is a one-to-one match between program functions and call graph
vertices, all the vertices can be uniquely labeled based on the name of the function
they represent.3 Moreover, on similar platforms, matching non-local function
3As there is a one-to-one mapping from extracted binary functions to call graph vertices and
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names generally point to the same function, making it possible to partially label
and match the functions between different call graphs based on non-local function
names.
Definition 4 (Call graph). A program’s call graph is a labeled directed graph
defined by 5-tuple G = (V(G), E(G), L, L, T), where V(G) is the set of vertices
each representing a single function in a program; E(G) is a set of directed edges
where (u, v) ∈ E(G) marks that there is a call from function represented by u to a
function represented by v; L is a set of possible labels, e.g. program’s function
names; L : V(G) → L is a labeling function that assigns an unique label to each
vertex; T : V(G) → {L,N} is a function that assigns a type for each vertex, L
means that corresponding function in the program is local and N that it is non-
local. Moreover, we will denote the set of all local functions in a call graph G by
VL(G) = { v | v ∈ V(G) : T(v) = L }, and similarly the set of all non-local functions by
VN(G) = { v | v ∈ V(G) : T(v) = N }.
It is important to notice that in our definition a single call graph is fully labeled,
but when we are dealing with a set of call graphs we treat them as partially labeled.
Each call graph G in a call graph set is partially labeled so that the set of non-local
functions, VN(G), is labeled, and the set of local functions, VL(G), is not. The need
for this change arises from the fact that the local function names can be heavily
altered in the compiling phase, and should not be trusted to have any real meaning.
The names of the non-local functions on the other hand are not usually altered at
the compiling phase, and matching non-local function names can be thought to
point into the same function as mentioned earlier.
Call graphs obtained via static analysis can contain also other relevant infor-
mation from the binary code. In general, it is possible to extract operational code
sequences for each local function in the binary. These sequences can be used to
create control flow graphs (CFG) of the local functions. Control flow graph of a
function represents all the possible paths the function’s basic block structure can
be traversed and the jump points to other basic blocks inside the function or to the
entry points of other functions. However, we restrict ourselves to only consider
caller-callee relationships, and no additional information of the local functions’
inner structure is used.
from function calls to call graph edges, we will make no distinction between nodes and underlying
functions and may refer to nodes as functions and directed edges as calls.
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3.3 Graph Similarity Measures
Graph similarity measures try to define, or approximate, how similar two graphs
G and H are. Various graph similarity measures have been proposed for different
purposes. The main approaches that have been used with call graphs are: ap-
proximate graph edit distance (GED), maximum common subgraphs (MCS), and
matching functions based on local neighborhoods and control flow graphs.
Graph edit distance [31] is a derivation of the Levenshtein (or edit) distance for
sequences [21]. It is obtained by computing how many alterations have to be done
to graph G for it to become isomorphic with graph H. Next, we will give more
formal definition of graph edit distance.
Definition 5 (Graph edit distance). Graph edit distance between labeled graphs G
and H is a minimum cost elementary operation sequence which transforms graph
G into graph H, where each of the elementary operations is assigned a certain cost.
For labeled graphs, elementary operations included are vertex and edge relabeling,
deletion and addition. In a basic situation, all operations have a fixed cost of 1.
As determining graph isomorphisms is neither known to be solvable in polyno-
mial time nor NP-complete [14], GED is usually approximated via some method.
Kinable [16] uses simple relabeling cost which is improved with simulated anneal-
ing in [17].
Maximum common subgraph techniques try to find maximal subgraph g that
is contained in both graphs. Finding a subgraph that is isomorphic with graph g
from a graph G is known to be NP-complete problem [8]. Therefore maximum
common subgraph techniques tend to become slow as the graph sizes increase.
Definition 6 (Maximum common subgraph). Maximum common subgraph be-
tween graphs G and H, is the subset of vertices in G, g ⊆ V(G), for which there
is a bijection to a subset of vertices in H, h ⊆ V(H), g is isomorphic to h, and |g| is
maximal.
Function matching concentrates on optimizing a mapping of nodes from graph
G to graph H. In call graphs they usually use local functions’ control flow graph
information to enhance the mapping algorithm (see, e.g. Carrera and Erdélyi [6]).
However, each implementation uses their own heuristics; making this approach
more diverse than the other two.
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3.4 Code Obfuscation
Code obfuscation techniques are used by malware authors in order to hinder the
detection of their malware by antivirus software, and once captured, the analysis
of the malware’s binary code. Obfuscation can be made beforehand, e.g. with
packers [29], or it can happen during the malware’s life in the wild by self-mutation
[5]. Next, we will take a short look on some of the obfuscation techniques that can
alter the structure of statically analysed call graphs. Interested readers can see e.g.
[35, 33, 29] for more thorough information.
For analysts dealing with binaries, the first task is to capture the program’s
binary code in order to analyse the code itself. For benign programs this is
easily done as static analysis techniques, like disassembly, can extract the program
binary’s code by simply reading it from the binary. However, binary code extraction
becomes harder for programs that can create and overwrite their code at runtime,
e.g. by packing the binary code to compressed or encrypted code, which is
unpacked at runtime. Packed code can be reverse engineered to resemble the
original executable by unpacking, but quality of the result is depended on the
exact tools used to pack – and unpack – the binary. On the other hand, malware
variants that overwrite their own code cause problems for static analysis as there
is no single point in time when all of the program’s code would be present in the
binary [29].
Disassembly resisting malware complicates capture of the code structure in
static analysis. Malware variants can have significant proportions of their codebase
consisting of hand-written assembly code with irregular structure. They can hide
code, corrupt the code analysis with non-code bytes, or even try to find errors in
disassemblers by stress testing them with large quantities of exceptional inputs.
Effectiveness of these techniques rest largely at the hands of disassembly tools
used.
Instruction obfuscation techniques conceal control-flow information of the pro-
gram. They can, for example, simulate function calls and returns with alternative
instruction sequences, use call and return instructions in non-standard way, or use
indirect calls.
Self-mutating malware variants are a special case of insctruction obfuscation
techniques that alter their own instructions. They can, e.g. substitute instruc-
tion sets with semantically equivalent sets, permutate mutually independent
instructions, insert dead-code4 into the program, change variables in semantically
4code that does not do anything
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irrelevant way, or alter control-flow information. However, as mutations occur
directly in the machine code – and therefore in the code of malware variants
themselves – they usually are rather simple. Observations have shown, that
malware variants that have undergone large patches of self-mutation tend to
consists of highly redundant and useless code [5]. Furthermore, call graphs are
quite resistant to the code mutations, as they tend to take place locally in small
patches, which do not alter the binary’s call structure.
4 Call Graph Features
Feature generation tries to find descriptive bits of information from a set of complex
data points. The generated features should aid to simplify the data and represent
the data well enough for meaningful analysis. The feature set can then be used,
e.g. to analyse similarities between the data points or to index data points for
fast retrieval from a database. The feature generation can be coupled with feature
extraction and feature selection; the latter being a special case of the former. Feature
exraction methods are used to reduce the redundancy and/or dimensionality of the
feature set by transforming the data into a lower dimension. The feature selection
is used to select a representative subset of current features as a new feature set.
When the data is represented as graphs, the most typically features generated
are frequent subgraphs. They are mined by one of the many frequent subgraph
mining algorithms (FSM); such as gSpan [38], MoFa [3], FFSM [13] or Gaston [24].
For a given graph set G and a threshold t, FSM algorithms extract all subgraphs g,
which are present in at least t graphs G ∈ G. However, most of the FSM algorithms
are constructed for undirected graphs and can not handle partially labeled directed
graphs, i.e. the algorithms are not build to address special properties of call graphs
and their underlying generative process.
In malware analysis, the feature generation approach is more frequently applied
in dynamic analysis than in static analysis. In a typical case, the interesting features
are defined beforehand, and their appearance is monitored during runtime. This
kind of feature generation needs expert knowledge to define the interesting
features, and does not (in its simplest form) recognize other interesting behavioral
patterns.
In the remainder of this section we introduce the call graph features, d-reachable
k-grams, proposed in this thesis. We begin by explaining the motivation behind the
features based on some notions on how the previously used call graph similarity
measures behave when underlying code is altered. Then, we present the features,
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give an example how they are generated and describe their basic properties. The
section ends by defining three types of values the generated features can have and
how the distance between two feature sets is computed.
4.1 Motivation
The idea behind d-reachable k-grams is simple: the feature set extracted from a
piece of software should exhibit similarity even though the underlying code has
undergone refactoring phases which do not alter the main functionality of the code,
and dissimmilarity when the functionality of the code has changed. To this extent
the call graph representation is already quite robust as it is invariant of many basic
refactoring techniques. However, typical call graph similarity measures, MCS and
GED, are still quite vulnerable to very basic code morphing processes that alter
the call graph structure.
Next, we will take a look at two of the morphing processes, which we will
name as local distortions and non-local distortions. Local distortions do not change
the code’s functionality but alter the call graph’s local topology. On the contrary,
non-local distortions can move large patches of code to be called from another
place in the program (therefore altering the call graph) and can have a substantial
effect on the program’s functionality.
4.1.1 Local Distortions
Local distortions are simple code refactoring processes that do not change the
code’s functionality, but alter the resulting call graph structure. Typically, they
are operations that split user defined (local) functions into smaller or redundant
pieces, or merge several local functions into one. The resulting call graph structure
can deceive similarity measures that depend on graph edit distance or maximum
common subgraphs. Example 1 introduces some local distortions and their effect
on call graph structure.
Example 1 (Local distortions). Consider naive Python code snippet and resulting
call graph seen in Figure 3. In this example, A and B are non-local functions which
can represent any imported library functions, and functions starting with L are
local, i.e. they are defined in the source files.
A simple local refactoring of the code, where L1 from Figure 3 has been divided
into two local functions L1 ja L2, is seen in Figure 4. Refactoring alters the call
graph structure, affecting the MCS or GED between the two call graphs. Repeated
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import A, B
def L1 ( ) :
A( )
B ( )
L1
A B
Figure 3: Original Python pseudocode and the resulting call graph
import A, B
def L1 ( ) :
L2 ( )
B ( )
def L2 ( ) :
A( )
L1
L2
A
B
Figure 4: Refactoring the original local function into two local functions.
application of similar refactoring patterns can distort the call graph heavily without
having any effect on code’s functionality.
Graph edit distance is even more prone to the addition of dummy user functions
with similar behaviour. This can be easily demonstrated by duplicating the original
local function and choosing by random which of the equivalent functions to call,
as seen in Figure 5. By replicating similar modifying process, the distance between
original graph and generated graphs grows without a limit.5
4.1.2 Non-Local Distortions
On the contrary to the local distortions, non-local distortions can have a significant
effect on the functionality, but can remain undetected if similarity is measured by
MCS or GED. An example of a simplified non-local distortion is given in Figure 6.
Non-local distortions can include, e.g. a subprocedure involving several local
functions that is first removed from the call structure and later applied into some
other part of the call structure, with a distinctively different purpose. If the
subprocedure itself has a single entrypoint, the GED would observe the change to
be only one edge removal and one edge insertion. MCS might stay indifferent of
the graph morphing process if the current MCS between the call graphs would not
contain the subprocess, but also be affected if it was contained.
5It should be noted, that disassemblers try to capture this kind of behavior during static analysis
of the binary.
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import A, B
from random import random as R
def L1 ( ) :
i f R ( ) > 0 . 5 :
L2 ( )
e lse :
L3 ( )
def L2 ( ) :
A( )
B ( )
def L3 ( ) :
A( )
B ( )
L1
L2
A B
R L3
A B
Figure 5: Duplicating original local function and adding a dummy function to
choose which one to call.
L1
L2
A B
C
L3 L4
D
(a) Original topology
L1
C
L3 L4
D L2
A B
(b) Topology after code transfer.
Figure 6: Simplified non-local distortion
It is important to notice, that similar graph morphing process can happen also
in the case where only refactoring of the code is done without actual functionality
changes. Thus, the similarity measure should (1) be able to either guess if the
actual functionality has changed, or (2) be robust enough in the sense that in
both situations some of the correct information is sustained. As the first option
appears to be a complex (and interesting) problem by itself, and solving it reliably
would probably require accessing the control flow graph information of the local
functions, we choose to use the latter approach as is seen in the next section which
introduces the chosen call graph features.
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4.2 Definition
In this section we define the proposed features, d-reachable k-grams. We will look
at the properties of the proposed features more closely in the next section.
In contrast to current methods that rely on graph matching techniques, we
propose a graph distance approximation based on features that are generated
from extended local neighborhoods, and are structurally flavoured. The considered
extended local neighborhoods do not only cover direct child nodes, but also
further descendants limited by a cutoff parameter. Structurally flavoured means,
that some structural properties are taken into account when similarity between
generated features are calculated, but small changes in a call graph’s call structure
are not considered to change feature’s identity into another. For now, we will only
consider the call graph structures that are accepted as features. We will talk more
about how exact value for each feature is computed in Section 4.4.
In essence, the proposed features are non-local function k-grams that are present
in a call graph G. As our call graphs have exactly one node for each function, and
non-local functions between call graphs can be directly matched, we can define our
features as ordered tuples of call graph node (function) labels (function names).
Furthermore, because we want our features to be locally oriented and sustain
some structural information, each k-gram has to have a local function root r, so
that each non-local function in the k-gram is reachable from r. To limit locality, we
define a cutoff parameter d, so that r is connected to each function in k-gram with a
shortest path at most length d, i.e. each function in k-gram is at most dth successor
of r. An example of how features are accepted and rejected is given in Figure 7.
Next, in Definition 7 we will give more formal definition for our features, which
we name d-reachable k-grams based on the cutoff parameter d and the cardinality
of the feature set k, respectively.
Definition 7 (d-reachable k-gram feature). A d-reachable k-gram feature f in a call
graph G is an ordered non-local function set of cardinality k, for which there exists
a local function root r, such that r is connected to each function in f with a shortest
path of length at most d. That is, f ⊆ VN(G) and
∣∣∣ f ∣∣∣ = k, and there exists r ∈ VL(G),
such that ∀n ∈ f : len(ps(r,n)) ≤ d .
As an exception, if d = 0 we don’t require any local function root r, but instead
consider only non-local function sets that are directly connected with each other6.
6Remember that the set of non-local functions may also contain e.g. thunk functions that are
used to assist calls to other functions. This leads to the fact that non-local functions can also call
other non-local functions in the call graphs.
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L1
L2
L3
B C
A
(a) Acceptable feature
L1
A L2
B
L3
C
(b) Non-acceptable feature
Figure 7: An example of how local call structure restricts feature generation. In
both figures we have VL(G) = {L1,L2,L3 } and VN(G) = {A,B,C }. Lets consider
the case where k = 3, and d = 3. We can see that in Figure 7a, L1 serves as a local
function root which is connected to all functions in VN(G). In Figure 7b there is no
such local function.
In essence, if k = 1 and d = 0 the feature set generated is exactly the set of non-local
functions, and the feature set generated with k = 2 and d = 0 would contain
non-local function pairs where one is directly called by the other.
As features are mined with a bottom up procedure (see Section 5), where the
k parameter defined is the maximum cardinality of non-local function set, we
differentiate single features from the whole feature set by naming our feature sets
as (k, d)-grams. A (k, d)-gram of a call graph consists of all d-reachable j-grams,
where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1, k} . Example 2 illustrates how (k, d)-gram feature set is
generated from a simple call graph.
Example 2 (Feature generation). As an illustrative example of the feature genera-
tion, let us consider a call graph extracted from a small Java program that is shown
Figure 8. We will generate the features from the call graph up to k = 5 starting
from k = 1 and d = 0.
The call graph, G, in Fig. 8 has four local functions, VL(G) = {Paaohjelma:<init>,
Paaohjelma:main, Kayttoliittyma:<init>, Kayttoliittyma:kaynnista} and five non-local
functions, VN(G) = {java.lang.Object:<init>, java.util.Scanner:<init>,
java.util.Scanner:nextLine, java.lang.String:equals, java.io.PrintStream:println}.
Now, if we generate features with k = 1 and d = 0, it is clear that the generated
function set is the same as VN(G). When increasing k and d the generated function
set will grow. With k = 2 and d = 1 the only local function than can serve as a
possible root for the new features is Kayttoliittyma:kaynnista, because no other local
function calls more than one non-local function. Making all the possible non-local
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Paaohjelma:main
Kayttoliittyma:kaynnista
Kayttoliittyma:<init>
java.util.Scanner:<init>
java.io.PrintStream:println
java.util.Scanner:nextLine
java.lang.String:equals
java.lang.Object:<init>
Paaohjelma:<init>
Figure 8: An example of a small call graph extracted from a Java program. The
orange nodes with methods starting with ‘java’ are library (non-local) functions,
and the blue nodes are user defined (local) functions.
function combinations from the functions called by Kayttoliittyma:kaynnista gives
us
(3
2
)
= 3 additional features:
• (java.io.PrintStream:println, java.lang.String:equals),
• (java.io.PrintStream:println, java.util.Scanner:nextLine) and
• (java.lang.String:equals, java.util.Scanner:nextLine).
If we increase d = 2, also Paaohjelma:main can serve as a root, and from there all the
possible non-local function pairs are reachable when d = 2. Combining the rest of
the possible non-local function pairs generates
(5
2
) − 3 = 7 features more:
• (java.io.PrintStream:println, java.lang.Object:<init>),
• (java.io.PrintStream:println, java.util.Scanner:<init>),
• (java.lang.Object:<init>, java.lang.String:equals),
• (java.lang.Object:<init>, java.util.Scanner:<init>),
• (java.lang.Object:<init>, java.util.Scanner:nextLine),
• (java.lang.String:equals, java.util.Scanner:<init>) and
• (java.util.Scanner:<init>, java.util.Scanner:nextLine).
With k = 3 and d = 1 we would only generate a single feature more:
(java.io.PrintStream:println, java.lang.String:equals, java.util.Scanner:nextLine).
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Then, increasing d to d = 2 would generate the rest
(5
3
) − 1 = 9 of the non-
local function combinations of cardinality three as all the non-local functions are
reachable from Paaohjelma:main when d = 2, similarly as it was in the case when
k = 2 and d = 2.
If we increase k = 4, we do not generate any features with d = 1 as the maximum
number of non-local functions any local functions calls is three. Increasing d = 2,
we will then generate all the possible features with four non-local functions, giving
us
(5
4
)
= 5 features more. Lastly, if k = 5 we do not generate any features when
d = 1, and when d = 2 we generate only a single feature which contains exactly the
non-local function set VN(G).
4.3 Properties
We will now take a look at some of the elementary properties (and limitations) of
our features, and how changes in the call graph structure affect our features. As
the main focus of our features is to be invariant of small refactoring processes – and
naive obfuscation techniques – that affect the call graph structure, we are mainly
interested in the two refactoring processes mentined earlier: local distortions and
non-local distortions.
Local distortions Local distortions affect the call graph’s topology locally, e.g by
inserting more local functions, deleting them, or applying some (typically gradual)
control structure changes. Our features are to some extent resilient to adding or
deleting local functions, as the cutoff parameter d gives us some flexibility on how
features are generated from the root function. Also, as the root function is not fixed
between the call graphs, a lot of local topology changes make us simply choose
another root for the feature generation, in effect keeping the generated feature set
the same.
However, the feature generation is affected if local distortions are applied
consecutively. For example, suppose we apply similar distortion as in the Example 1
from Figure 3 to Figure 4 many times in a row so that each local function added is
inserted to be called from the local function inserted in the previous distortion.
At some point inserting new local function collides with our cutoff d and feature
(A,B) cannot be generated from the root L1 anymore.
Non-local distortions Non-local distortions appear in a call graph what a portion
of the code is transferred to another location in the call graph. For example, let us
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look at the Figure 6 where the subtree with L2 as a root is transferred to be called
from L4 instead of L1. If we have defined that the cutoff parameter d = 3, then any
feature set generated from the subgraph shown in the image is not affected, as L3
serves as a root from which all non-local functions can be reached before and after
the distortion. Same goes for d = 1 as local functions’ calls to non-local functions
is not changed. However, if d = 2 we can see that in Figure 6a we can generate
second order features (A,C) and (B,C), but after the code transfer in Figure 6b we
generate features (A,D) and (B,D) instead.
4.4 Call Graph Distance Using Features
We now have discussed which kind of features we are interested in, and their
properties. However, we are yet to cover how we can compute a distance between
two call graphs based on the generated feature sets and feature values. Next, we
will define the distance between call graphs. The computed distance depends
on the feature values, which we will discuss after we have defined the distance
measure. For now, it is sufficient to know that we denote the value of feature f in
a call graph G with vG( f ). Howerer, if the call graph is clear from the context, we
may also use a shorthand notation v( f ).
Definition 8 (Graph distance with d-reachable k-grams). Distance between two
call graphs G and H, dist(G,H), is the summed distance between their feature sets,
F(G) and F(H), respectively. More precisely,
dist(G,H) =
∑
f∈F(G)∪F(H)
∣∣∣vG( f ) − vH( f )∣∣∣ w( f ), (1)
where vG( f ) is the value of feature f in call graph G, 0 ≤ vG( f ) ≤ 1, and w( f ) is the
weight for the feature f , 0 ≤ w( f ) ≤ 1, for all f . In a basic setting the weight of the
features is constant, ∀ f : w( f ) = 1.
As the distance between call graphs is the distance between their feature sets,
we need define the value vG( f ) for each feature f in each call graph G. Even though
the proposed features themselves try to be resistant to small changes in the call
graph topology, we can include some information about the local topology into
the values of the extracted features aiming for more precise representation of the
call graph. In theory, more precise representation of a single call graph should
result in a more precise computation of the distance between two call graphs.
Before we give the exact formulas to compute different value types, let us
consider some traits that the feature values should exhibit. Let feature f be a
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d-reachable k-gram for some k > 1 and d > 0, and vG( f ), vH( f ) and vX( f ) be the
values of feature f in call graphs G, H and X, respectively.
First, consider the case where feature is found from call graphs G and H, but not
from X. To compute the difference for the feature f between G (or H) and X we need
to give f a value in X, as only computing the difference between intersecting feature
sets for two call graphs is hardly a meaningful distance measure. Furthermore,
the value for vX( f ) must be selected in such a way that if the feature f has been
found from G with a smaller d than from H, then the difference between vX( f ) and
vH( f ) is smaller than the difference between vX( f ) and vG( f ). The reason for this
originates from a following observation: if we do not find f from X up to certain d,
we have no proof that f could not be found from X with d + 1.
For the above mentioned reasons, we use a dummy feature value for each
feature not found from a call graph G, ∀ f * VN(G) : vG( f ) = 0. Also, we give
the features higher values when they are found closer to their root function by
computing maximum value m for each k based on the feature value type (the m
can vary between different values of k) and d, and then use this maximum value to
“flip” feature values so that the features found further away from the root (that is,
non-local functions are generally further away from the connecting local function
root) have values closer to zero than features found closer to the root (e.g. each
non-local function is directly called by the root).
Second trait to consider is that the features of higher order (features generated
with larger k) should not have larger maximum values than the features of lower
order. The reason for this is simple, the higher order features would start to
increasingly dominate the distance measure (remember that there is already a high
change that the higher order feature set is exponentially larger compared to lower
order feature set), because the difference of a single feature value could be higher
between call graphs. To overcome this aspect, we use the maximum value m for
each k to normalize the feature values, giving us feature values that are constrained
between zero and one for all call graphs and all the features. Furthermore, if the
feature is generated with the exception case d = 0, its value in all the feature value
types is one.
Next, we will describe three types of values the generated features can be
assigned to: binary, maximum distance, and sum of distances.
Binary The simplest feature value type is binary. Binary feature value represents
the existence of feature f ∈ VN(G). It is zero if the feature is not found from graph
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G with the given d, and one if it is found. That is, the value of feature f , vG( f ), is
vG( f ) =
1 if f ⊆ VN(G)0 otherwise. (2)
Maximum distance With maximum distance as the value of a feature f in a
call graph G is based to be the maximum distance between the root, r, and any
non-local function in a feature. Formally, the value of feature f , vG( f ), is computed
as follows:
vG( f ) =
m(
∣∣∣ f ∣∣∣ , d) −max{ len(ps(r,n)) | n ∈ f }
d
, (3)
where ps(·) is the shortest path between two functions, d is the maximum reachability
used to generate the features, and ∀ f : m(
∣∣∣ f ∣∣∣ , d) = d + 1.
Sum of distances The most complex feature value is based on the sum of
distances between root and all non-local functions in the feature. Given a feature
f , we compute the value of feature, vG( f ), as follows:
vG( f ) =
m(
∣∣∣ f ∣∣∣ , d) − (∑n∈ f len(ps(r,n)))
m(
∣∣∣ f ∣∣∣ , d) − 1 , (4)
where ps(·) is the shortest path between two functions, d is the maximum reachability
used to generate the features, and ∀ f : m(
∣∣∣ f ∣∣∣ , d) = ∣∣∣ f ∣∣∣ × d + 1.
5 Algorithm
In this section we present an example algorithm for generating (k, d)-grams from a
call graph, and optional pre- and postprocessing steps. Our preprocessing step
tries to minimize local distortions in each call graph, and postprocessing step
is used after the features from the whole dataset have been generated in order
weight the features and optionally prune some of the features. The main algorithm
is implemented in a straight forward manner, and is described here only as an
illustrative example of the implementation, not as a heavily optimized version of
the generation process.
Next, in Section 5.1 we will first look at the preprocessing step which aims to
tighten the call graph layout. Then, we move to main algorithm implementation
in Section 5.2. Last, in Section 5.3 we describe some postprocessing procedures,
which aim to reduce the redundancy in the collected feature set and enhance
overall effectiveness of the collected features.
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L1
L2
A B
C L3
D
(a) Original local topology
L1
A B C L3
D
(b) Local topology after merging.
Figure 9: Tightening the call graph topology by merging single parent local
functions with their parent. The local function L2 from Figure 9a is merged into its
parent L1 in Figure 9b.
5.1 Preprocessing
Although the d-reachable k-grams try to diminish the effect of the local distortions
themselves, we experiment with an optional preprocessing step in order to tighten
the call graph’s topology before the features are extracted. In this step, we prune
away local functions that have only a single parent by combining them with their
parent. An example of this procedure can be seen in Figure 9. In source code,
this process has a similar meaning as defining the function to be merged as inline
function.
5.2 Main Algorithm
The main algorithm for generating (k, d)-grams is simple, and can be seen to have
some similarities to the frequent subgraph mining algorithms. Perhaps the most
prominent difference is that the algorithm is run for each call graph separately.
This can be done because we are interested in exhaustively mining all the function
sets within maximum distance d. Thus, we cannot save computation time by first
mining the (k − 1) function sets from all the call graphs in the dataset, computing
their support, and then pruning from the feature set the features with lower
support than the defined minimum support. In fact, we save computation time
as only the (k − 1)-function sets found in a single call graph are used to generate
k-function sets. This approach allows addition of new call graphs iteratively, as
the minimum support of the features does not need to be adjusted.
The main body of the algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. The algorithm
takes as an input a call graph G and feature generation parameters k and d, and
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Algorithm 1: Main algorithm for generating d-reachable k-grams
Input: G: a call graph
Input: k: maximum number of non-local functions in a feature
Input: d: maximum distance from root local function to non-local function
Output: generated features
1 begin
2 features← generateZeros(G, k)
3 if k > 1 then
4 distances← shortestPaths(G, d)
5 collect pairs of non-local functions that have same key in distances to
pairs and note their maximal feature value
6 features← features ∪ pairs
7 lastFeats← pairs
8 while i← 3 to k do
9 newFeats← generate(distances, lastFeats)
10 features← features ∪ newFeats
11 lastFeats← newFeats
12 i← i + 1
13 collect the maximal values for each feature from features and return them
returns the maximal value for each generated feature depending on the feature
value choice (see Section 4.4 for possible feature values). The algorithm starts
on line 2 by generating features for the exception d = 0, where the features do
not have any local function root, i.e. it collects non-local feature sets where one
of the non-local functions is the root and all other functions are its descendants.
In line 4 it proceeds to compute (directed) distances between all local functions
and non-local functions up to a cutoff d with a slightly modified all pairs shortest
path algorithm, which is introduced in Algorithm 2. The shortest path algorithm
outputs a mapping from local functions to lists of pairs, where each pair contains
a non-local function and the distance from the local function to the non-local
function.
After generating the shortest paths, in line 5, the algorithm gathers all non-local
function pairs that are at most dth successor of some local function r to pairs, and in
lines 8–13, the algorithm iteratively increments the cardinality of the features. For
each cardinality i it uses the features generated for cardinality i − 1 as the starting
poin, i.e. in the first iteration pairs generated in line 5 are used to generate triplets,
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and so on. The main procedure to generate the features, generate, is called in line
9, and is described in Algorithm 3. The algorithm ends by collecting the maximal
value for each feature f from the generated feature candidates.7
Algorithm 2 describes how shortest paths from all local functions to non-local
functions are computed with a cutoff d. The algorithm runs iteratively a slightly
modified single source shortest path with a cutoff for each local function in a call
graph G as the source . For each source l ∈ VL(G), it sets the target to be the set
of non-local functions VN(G). It outputs a dictionary where local functions are
keys and values are lists of 2-tuples. Each 2-tuple contains a name of a non-local
function and the length of the shortest path to that function from the local function
used as the key. The algorithm behaves exactly same as normal single source
shortest path with a cutoff for each source, but instead of calculating paths to
all other nodes, we set a variable notFound to be VN(G) at the start of the loop
for each local function root and terminate the computation also when notFound
= ∅. In order to save computation time in the following generation phase, we do
not construct full distance matrix (that is, set distances to other nodes to infinity),
because then we should also process the nodes we already know we do not need
to because of they are further away from the root than the cutoff factor d.
In Algorithm 3, the previously generated feature set for cardinality i is used as
a starting point to generate the feature set for cardinality i + 1. The routine takes
each feature from the previous feature set into consideration and looks from which
local function it has been generated as root. Then, it looks from distances all the
non-local functions that are d-reachable from root, and combines a new feature if
the function is not already in the currently considered feature. Lastly, it computes
the feature’s value using the defined feature value option, and appends the feature
to new feature set, which is returned at the end.
5.3 Post-processing
The post-processing step takes place after features from all call graphs have been
collected. We experiment with two techniques: pruning and weighting of features.
Pruning Pruning attemps to reduce the noise in the distances computed from
the feature sets by removing features that are only present in a single call graph in
the dataset. These features are removed because they only add distance between
7In order to save computation time, this step can be done while generating the features in
Algorithm 1 on lines 5 and 9.
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Algorithm 2: shortestPaths Modified all pairs shortest paths algorithm that
computes paths only from local functions to non-local functions with prede-
termined cutoff d. Called from Algorithm 1 on line 4.
Input: G : a call graph
Input: d : cutoff, only distances at max d are considered
Output: distances: a map from local functions (keys) to lists (values), where
each list contains (non-local function, distance)-tuples for all
non-local functions that are at most d-reachable from the local
function used as the key.
1 begin
2 initialise distances to an empty map
3 for root ∈ VL(G) do
4 notFound← VN(G)
5 level← 1
6 paths← {root: (root,)}
7 nextLevel← {root }
8 while nextLevel , ∅ and notFound , ∅ and level ≤ d do
9 thisLevel← nextLevel
10 nextLevel← ∅
11 for func ∈ thisLevel do
12 for child ∈ successors(func) do
13 if child < paths then
14 paths(child)← paths(func) + child
15 add child to nextLevel
16 if child ∈ notFound then
17 delete child from notFound
18 level← level + 1
19 remove paths that do not end in a non-local function from paths
20 compute the length of each path to non-local function in paths
21 store (non-local function, length)-pairs as a list to distances with key
root
the graph they are in and all the other graphs. With a lot of features only present
in a single graph, the effective distances may be strongly altered.
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Algorithm 3: generate Routine to compute features of cardinality i from
features of cardinality i − 1. Called from Algorithm 1 on line 9.
Input: distances: distances from local functions to non-local functions
Input: lastFeats: (i, d)-gram features
Output: newFeats: (i + 1, d)-gram features
1 begin
2 newFeats← ∅
3 for feat ∈ lastFeats do
4 root← getRoot(feat)
5 for func ∈ distances(root) do
6 if func < feat then
7 newFeat← func ∪ feat
8 assign a value to newFeat based on the chosen value type and
distances
9 add newFeat to newFeats
Feature weighting Feature weighting aims to solve the effect of the combinatorial
explosion of the number of generated features when k increases. With each increase
in k the feature set gets proportionally larger, as the amount of non-local function
combinations increases. This raises implicitly some questions, e.g. “Which features
should we be interested in?” and “Are features of order three more interesting
than features of order two?”. Our answer to these questions is to limit the effect
the feature set of each order has on the distance measure. We do this by weighting
each feature in the generated feature set by the number of features generated
for that order from all call graphs in the dataset. For example, if the number of
features for the order 2 is B, then the weight for each feature f of order 2 is set to
w( f ) = 1/B.
6 Datasets
In our experiments we use two distinct datasets: a programming exercise dataset
gathered from university students at the Department of Computer Science of the
University of Helsinki, and a malware dataset obtained from F-Secure Corporation.
We will call the former as the student dataset, and the latter as the malware dataset.
Next, we will give a short description of the two datasets, how they were obtained,
and what they consist of.
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The student dataset The student dataset was automatically gathered from the
students majoring in computer science during the first mandatory programming
course. During the course students used an IDE plug-in that automatically collected
snapshots from their exercises, e.g. when they sent the exercise to be evaluated
to a server that ran a set of predefined tests on the exercise code, or when they
saved, ran or built the project. Large amount of snapshots were gathered this
way from each exercise each student attempted to solve. Our student dataset is a
part of a larger dataset previously used, e.g. to assess how students try to solve
programming exercises of various difficulty levels (see Hosseini et al. [11]), and
how to automatically recognize which students are in need of assistance using
machine learning (see Ahadi et al. [2]).
We restrict ourselves to only few exercises from the whole course. The exercises
are hand picked so that the final programs are fairly complex and the assignments
give the students the freedom to design the program architecture on their own.
Furthermore, we only consider the last snapshot for each exercise individual
student has returned. These snapshots are all successful solving attempts (i.e. all
tests for the particular exercise are passed). In our experiments we handle the
identity of the exercise as the true class and each successfully returned solving
attempt for an exercise is a data point belonging to that class.
The dataset consists of five Java programming exercises and the number of
students returning different exercises vary from 47 to 101 with a total number
of 366 exercises returned. On average returned exercises have 38 functions from
which 19.63 are non-local (Java’s standard library functions). Minimum number
of functions in any exercise is 2 and non-local functions 1, whereas maximum
number of all functions is 78 and non-local functions is 36. Total amount of unique
non-local functions called in the dataset is 170.
The malware dataset The malware dataset was obtained from F-Secure Corpo-
ration, and is the same that is used in the works of Kinable et al. [16, 18, 17]. It
contains 194 malware variants – distinguished by hash codes, i.e. character strings
derived from the file’s content – in 24 different families, family sizes ranging from
2 to 17.8 Family labels for the malware variants were given by experts; variants
labeled to the same family are considered to have more similarities among them
than variants labeled to different families. Later, we refer to these labelings by
8One hash code of a malware variant was discovered to be tagged into two different families,
reducing the amount of unique call graphs to 193. To avoid confusion, we removed the variant
from the larger malware family.
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Figure 10: Number of all functions and non-local functions per malware variant,
sorted by the number of all functions.
experts as true labels or true classes.
The call graphs in the datasets are context insensitive, and constructed from
the information gained via static analysis. The IDA Pro [9] disassembler and some
other utility tools were used to obtain call graphs from files in 32-bit Portable
Executable (PE) file format – which is used in, e.g., executables and DLLs on
Windows operating system – on the x86 architecture. As all the call graphs are
obtained from binaries built to the same operating system and architecture, we
can use our assumption that non-local functions with matching names can be
considered equivalent.
As the amount of families and varying family sizes suggests: the dataset is
quite diverse. The following, are some key aspects of the dataset presented in
figures.
Figure 10 shows the number of all functions and non-local function per malware
variant, sorted by the number of all functions. Here, we observe that the amount
of local functions does not predict the amount of non-local functions as the two
curves do not have similar characteristics. In some variants nearly all functions
are non-local and in some variants about two-thirds can be local functions.
Figure 11 shows the number of malware variants containing each non-local
function. The immediate observation is that about ten non-local functions are
in nearly all of the malware variants. Another interesting observation lies at the
other end of the curve, as two-thirds of the non-local functions called in the whole
dataset appear in only few variants, and over a thousand non-local functions are
found in exactly one variant. This suggests that feature pruning will have strong
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Figure 11: Number of malware variants containing each non-local function found
in the malware dataset, sorted by the number of variants containing the non-local
functions.
effect on the size of the feature sets as each feature that has a non-local function
found from only one variant is pruned. For example, in the case of k = 1 the feature
set is pruned to about two-thirds.
Figure 12 shows the fraction of matching non-local function names between
malware variants (darker colors indicate more matching functions), sorted by the
family and family size. The ticks in the graphs are between the different malware
families. Looking at the figure we immediately observe that generally the amount
of matching non-local functions is higher inside the malware family than between
families. However, there are some families for which several variants share more
functions with another family’s variants than with variants of the same family. It is
important to notice here that the true family labels are set by analyst, not a ground
truth which could not vary depending on the analyst applying the labeling.
7 Experiments
Having defined our features, inspected some of their basic properties and described
an algorithm to generate them. We will move to evaluate how well our features
actually perform in different experiments. By performance we mean both the
success in various tasks, and the execution time to generate the features. The goal
of our experiments is to find answers to the following questions:
1. How do the choices of k and d affect the performance?
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Figure 12: The fraction of matching non-local function names between pairs of
malware variants. Dataset has been sorted based on malware families. Darker
colors indicate a larger proportion of matching functions.
2. How do (k, d)-grams perform in comparison to other methods?
The experiments to answer the questions above are twofold. For Question
1., we evaluate how well (k, d)-grams perform with different values of k and d
in retrieval tasks in Section 7.1. Based on the results of the retrieval tasks, we
fix the values of k and d to the ones with the best performance, and perform
clustering experiment with these values in Section 7.2. To answer Question 2., we
compare the performance of the (k, d)-grams to the baseline of non-local function
sets (effectively (1, 0)-grams) for both datasets, and for the malware dataset to the
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Experiment setting Default value
maximum cardinality of the feature sets, k 2
maximum distance of the non-local functions, d 3
feature value type binary
preprocessing: tightening of topology No
postprocessing: pruning Yes
postprocessing: feature weighting Yes
Table 1: Default values used thorough the experiments.
GED approximations of Kinable and Kostakis [17].
We do not report in the experiments all the possible combinations of the pre-
and postprocessing steps of the algorithm, or the exact performance of each feature
value type in each experiment. However, we will give a rough estimation of how
large performance differences between our default settings, shown in Table 1, and
some of the combinations are in the retrieval tasks. We have chosen this approach
because (1) it keeps the experiments section uncluttered, and (2) the performance
difference between the different setting decisions is in most cases nominal.
We have chosen the default values based on preliminar empirial testing. We
do not use tightening of the topology as a preprocessing step because it gave us
worse performance across the board. Also, we use pruning and feature weighting
as they seemed to be effective in increasing the performance. However, the
performance increase was in most cases negligible, and they could be left out
without a significant drop in performance. For the feature value type, we have
chosen to use binary value for its simplicity. In our preliminar tests all the feature
value types gave similar performance, the overall winner varying between different
values of k and d.
7.1 Information Retrieval Tasks
We use information retrieval tasks to get a basic understanding of how (k, d)-grams
perform. For testing the information retrieval task we use both datasets, and
compare our results to a baseline and in addition the results of the malware dataset
to the results obtained with GED approximation of Kinable and Kostakis [17].
The information retrieval tasks we use are precision and mean average precision
(MAP). Next, we will describe both tasks, and then show the results for the tasks for
different k and d values, how the selection affects the feature generation time, and
how the best performing k and d perform in comparison to GED approximation
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(for the malware dataset) and baseline.
Precision Precision computes the percent of the retrieved data points that are
relevant to the query. In our case, as we have a number of classes in the datasets,
we calculate precision to be the percent of data points that have the nearest data
point in the same class. Let S be the dataset; dist(·) be a distance function defined
for all data point pairs in the dataset S; C be a set of possible labels; a labeling
function L : S→ C assigns the true label for each data point si ∈ S; and ci be the
data point closest to data point si, that is ci = arg minx∈S\si dist(si, x). Now, precision
is calculated as
precision =
|{ si | si ∈ S : L(si) = L(ci) }|
|S| . (5)
Mean average presicion (MAP) Mean average precision captures performance
over the whole dataset better than precision. It is an aggregate measure over
average precisions of all the data points in the dataset and is shown to have
good stability [23]. An average precision of a data point is computed using a
precision-at-k, where k is the amount of documents we want to retrieve. It is
computed as the percentage of k closest data points that belong to the same class
as the data point used as a query. An average precision of a data point si is then
the average of each precision-at-k up to a maximum ki for the data point si. In our
case, we fix ki = ti − 1 to be the maximum k for the data point si, where ti is the
number of data points in the class the data point si belongs to in the dataset S.
Mean average precision is then the mean of all the average precisions of the data
points in the dataset S. Let pi(k) be the precision-at-k for a data point si, then, the
mean average precision over the whole dataset S, MAP(S), is computed as
MAP(S) =
1
|S|
∑
si∈S
1
ki
ki∑
k=1
pi(k). (6)
The malware dataset The results for the malware dataset’s retrieval tasks are
shown in the Fig. 13 and Fig. 14. Figure 13 shows the results for precisions and
mean average presicions, while Figure 14 shows the number of features generated
and their generation time. In both figures, the horisontal line for k = 1 shows only
the result of k = 1 and d = 0, as there is not much point in generating features for
d > 0, when k = 1 (the resulting feature set is the same or smaller). Furthermore,
due to exponential running time increase, the results for k = 4 are only computed
for d ∈ {0, 1, 2}
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Figure 13: Precisions acquired for the malware dataset with different k and d values,
other parameters are set to default values as described in Table 1. Figure 13a shows
precision and Figure 13b shows results for mean average precision.
Looking at Figure 13 we can immediately see two things. First, the choice for k
and d does not seem to have much effect on the results. Second, the performance
of the best parameter values (k = 2 and d ∈ {3, 4}) differs only slightly from the
baseline results with k = 1 and d = 0, which effectively compares the non-local
function sets between the call graphs. Here, it is interesting to note that, as the
precise choice of d does not affect the results much, it could suggest that (1) the call
graphs in the malware dataset are already quite compact, and (2) the refactoring or
obfuscation processes affect the local topology of the call graphs much more often
than non-local topology. On the otherhand, as also increasing the k does not have
much effect on the results, we could say that the d-reachable k-grams are quite
robust features for capturing similarity between the call graphs in the malware
dataset.
In Figure 14, we have much clearer – and expected – result: the higher the
k and d the more features are generated, which has a straightforward effect to
the generation time. Unsurprisingly, the effect of k is much bigger than d, as the
number of possible non-local function combinations grows exponentially with
every increase of k, while d only affects the localness of the feature search.
Looking at the Figures 13 and 14 together we can come to a conclusion that, for
the malware dataset, the k = 2 and d ∈ {3, 4} seems to acquire the best performance,
as the retrieval tasks give their best scores, and the generation time of the features
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Figure 14: Number of generated features from the malware dataset (Figure 14a)
and the time needed to generate them (Figure 14b) for different k and d values.
is still quite low.
To give an image of how different setting choices affect the results, we generated
(2, 3)-grams with different feature value types and without postprocessing steps
separately. We observed that the feature value type choice had very little effect in
the retrieval task performance. The maximum distance and the sum of distances
feature value types for (2, 3)-grams gave results that differ less than 0.01 for the
precision and 0.003 for MAP when compared to the results obtained with binary
feature values. Postprocessing had more pronounced effect on the results. When
we removed both postprocessing steps, pruning and weighting of features, the
precision dropped about 0.02 and MAP about 0.05 for (2, 3)-grams with binary
feature value. Removing only the pruning recudes the precision about 0.01 and
MAP less than 0.004.
Now, let’s compare our results to the results obtained with graph edit distance
approximation by Kinable and Kostakis [17]. We were given a distance matrix
computed with the method, and we ran the same precision and MAP tests for
the distance matrix. The results for GED approximation are shown in Table 2. In
the table we can see that the GED approximation outperforms our features when
comparing mean average precisions, but is slightly inferior in precision.
To see how meaningful the results are, we run the retrieval tasks with all
the methods (i.e. (1, 0)-grams, (2, 3)-grams and GED approximations) 1000 times
with bootstrapping and get 95% confidence intervals of +/- 5% for each method.
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Figure 15: Precisions acquired for the student dataset with different k and d values,
other parameters are set to default values as described in Table 1. Figure 15a shows
precision and Figure 15b shows results for mean average precision.
Such a wide interval implies that all the methods are actually performing on a
similar level, and the choices of k and d for (k, d)-grams have little to do with the
performance.
Task GED (2, 3)-grams (1, 0)-grams
precision 0.8135 0.8238 0.8031
MAP 0.5492 0.5121 0.5114
Table 2: Retrieval task results for the malware dataset obtained with graph edit
distance approximation of Kinable and Kostakis [17], (2, 3)-grams and (1, 0)-grams.
The student dataset For the student dataset, we perform the same retrieval tasks
but do not compare the results to the GED approximations. Figure 15 and Figure 16
show the obtained results. In Figure 15 we observe that the best performance for
the retrieval tasks is actually obtained with the baseline non-local function sets of
(1, 0)-grams, but the differences in this dataset are also quite negligible between
various k and d selections. Peculiarly, the performance seems to drop from d = 0 to
d = 1, but increases again when d > 1. We will get back to possible causes of the
above mentioned performance in Section 8.
In Figure 16 we see the same unsurprising result for the student dataset as with
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Figure 16: Number of generated features from the student dataset (Figure 16a)
and the time needed to generate them (Figure 16b) for different k and d values.
the malware dataset: increasing k and d generates more features (Fig. 16a) and
increases the time needed to generate them (Fig. 16b). However, here the overall
increase in the number of features or in the runtime is not so large as in case of the
malware dataset, because (1) the call graphs in the student dataset are on average
much smaller than in the malware dataset, and (2) the student dataset is devoid of
larger programs with hundreds of non-local and local functions.
Choosing the best values for k and d Having performed the retrieval tasks we
will select the best performing k and d values for the clustering that is done in
the next section. In our selection we will give a higher weight to the results of
the malware dataset as it represents more well structured problem for call graph
distance measurements (the assumption is that many of the malware variants are
just obfuscated or altered versions of other variants in the same malware family).
With this in mind we select k = 2 and d = 3 as our clustering parameters, as they
give the best performance for the malware dataset, and have reasonably good
performance for the student dataset.
7.2 Clustering
As the second and final experiment, we use our (2, 3)-grams to perform clustering
for the datasets. The goal of clustering is to divide a set of data points into multiple
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groups so that data points inside a group are more similar to each other than to
data points in other groups. Clustering can be done in several ways, for example:
hierarchical (top-down) Splits the dataset consecutively into smaller groups.
hierarchical (bottom-up) Starts with each data point in its own group and con-
secutively selects groups to merge.
centroid-based Finds representative centroids from the data and builds clusters
around them.
density-based Clusters are found in areas with high density of data points.
Each of the above mentioned methods have their own advantages and dis-
advantages, and selecting a suitable clustering method is usually acquired by
analysing the data in hand. We will next describe how we selected the clustering
method, spectral clustering, for our malware dataset. Then, we move to describe
basic parameter settings for spectral clustering, and how we evaluate (without
knowledge of the true labels) which parameter setting performs best. Finally, we
perform the clustering with the chosen parameters, and evaluate performance
with a set of key values used to describe clustering performance. The approach is
similar to the one used by Kinable and Kostakis [16, 17], but we (1) use different
clustering algorithm, and (2) compare the results obtained with our method to the
results obtained with the method described in [17].
Choosing the clustering algorithm Selection of the clustering algorithm is often
open for several choices, because of the plethora of clustering algorithms available
(see, e.g [1]). Our choice for the clustering algorithm comes from the inspection of
how the acquired distances behave when the dimensionality of the data is reduced.
We use multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) [36, 19] for the dimension reduction. In
effect, MDS aims to lower the dimensionality of the data by placing each data
point into a low-dimensional space so that the distances between the data points
are preserved as well as possible.
In Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 multi-dimensional scaling (N = 2) is applied to the distance
matrix computed from the (2, 3)-grams of the datasets. Fig. 17 shows the result
for the malware dataset and Fig. 18 shows the result for the student dataset.The
different color-marker combinations of the data points correspond to the true
classes.9 In Figure 17 we observe that although a lot of data points are gathered in
9We use color and marker style to distinguish the true classes for visualisation purposes, but in
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Figure 17: Multi-dimensional scaling for the malware dataset.
the middle there are also several distinct malware family clusters. Similarly, in
Figure 18 we see that the data points for different exercises are quite well separated,
with the two exercises in the middle overlapping each other. However, there are
no clear gaps between the clouds of data points for different exercises.
Classical MDS uses eigenvalue decomposition to derive coordinate matrix.
This suggests that our distance matrices could be suitable for spectral clustering
(see, e.g. [32, 22]) as spectral clustering uses eigenvalues of the distance matrix to
first reduce the data into lower dimension before applying the actual clustering.10
Spectral clustering The term spectral clustering refers to a family of clustering
methods that use eigenvalues of the provided distance matrix to first project
the data into a lower dimension before applying the clustering. The algorithm
a real case we would not have this information. Also, recall that the true classes of the malware
dataset are determined by the malware analysts and the true classes of the student datase are the
exercise identities.
10We also experimented with other clustering algorithms, but choose to use spectral clustering
because it gave the best performance in preliminary empirical testing.
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Figure 18: Multi-dimensional scaling for the student dataset.
starts with building a graph from the distance matrix with a chosen method,
lowering the dimensionality according to the graph to selected amount of clusters
K (effectively selecting the first K eigenvectors of the so called graph Laplacian),
and then applying the well known k-means clustering algorithm with the selected
K to the data in the lower dimension [22]. For building our graph, we use the
simple k nearest neighbour (k-nn) method, where each data point is connected
to its k closest datapoints in the distance matrix. We choose k-nn since it has the
ability to connect data points from areas of different densities, but can also provide
a graph with several disconnected components if the high density areas are well
separated [22]. Since the selection of k in k-nn does not have a well studied basis,
we will experiment with nearest neighbor values, k-nn ∈ {7, 9, 11, 13}.
Choosing the number of clusters After choosing the clustering algorithm and
selecting its basic settings, we are left with the fundamental problem of selecting
the proper amount of clusters, K, to which we will divide our dataset. We choose
to evaluate both the k-nn and the number of clusters at the same time with a
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silhouette value, a clustering measurement originally suggested by Rousseeuw
[30]. Silhouette value aims to capture the fundamental definitions of clustering
without explicit information of the true classes, i.e. it measures how similar a data
point is to the data points in the same cluster, and how dissimilar it is to the data
points in other clusters. In effect, it tries to measure how well a data point fits into
its cluster. Silhouette value is always between -1 and 1, where high value indicates
that the data points are well matched to their clusters.11 Let a(si) be the average
dissimilarity of a data point si to other data points in the same cluster, and b(si) be
the average dissimilarity of si to the data points in the nearest cluster where si is
not a member. Now silhouette value for a data point si, sil(si), can be defined as
sil(si) =
b(si) − a(si)
max(b(si), a(si))
. (7)
With silhouette value for a single data point, we can define an aggregate measure
of average silhoutte value over all datapoints in a dataset S to be
sil(S) =
1
|S|
∑
si∈S
sil(si). (8)
We use the average silhoutte score as the measure to verify how well the data
points as a whole fit into their clusters. We run spectral clustering algorithm with
a range of number of clusters and k-nn ∈ {7, 9, 11, 13}, and compute the average
silhouette value from ten runs for each setting. For the malware dataset we let the
number of clusters range from five to 80 and for the student dataset from two to 14.
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 19. Figure 19a shows the
results for the malware dataset, where we can see that selection of k-nn has some
effect on the silhouette value, but the actual number of clusters has more effect
as expected. The highest silhouette value for the malware dataset, 0.59, with a
narrow marging stands in 23 clusters with k-nn = 13.12
The results for the student dataset in Figure 19b are more complex. Overall,
we observe that the silhouette values are not so high as in the malware dataset.
Furthermore, there is a spike in the silhouette values when the number of clusters is
four. For k-nn ∈ {7, 13} the spike it is upwards, but for k-nn ∈ {9, 11} it is downwards.
This might be an anomaly on, e.g. how the graph from the data points is constructed
in spectral clustering, but we still choose to select the clustering parameters with
11As a rule of thumb one could say that the values over 0.5 indicate that a reasonable structure
has been found.
12Recall that the number of malware families (classes) in the dataset was 24.
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Figure 19: Silhouette values for (2, 3)-grams using spectral clustering with nearest
neighbor kernel and different nearest neighbor options.
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the best silhouette value, 0.37, which is obtained when the number of clusters is
four and k-nn = 13.13
Next, we will use these clustering parameters to evaluate our clustering results
for both datasets.
Results As we now have selected the clustering algorithm, and have evaluated
the optimal clustering parameters for the datasets, we can analyse the clustering
results with the selected parameters. In order to acquire meaningul comparison
results for the malware dataset’s (2, 3)-grams, we use the same average silhouette
value test find optimal parameter values for both GED approximation and (1, 0)-
grams, and acquire the number of clusters and k-nn value that maximizes the
average silhouette value. We find that for GED approximation the optimal number
of clusters is 21 and k-nn = 13, and for (1, 0)-grams the number of clusters is 23
and k-nn = 13. As we do not have GED approximations for the student data set,
we will only compare our (2, 3)-grams to the baseline of (1, 0)-grams. The optimal
clustering parameters for the (1, 0)-grams in the student dataset are ten for the
number of clusters and k-nn = 13.
To evaluate our final clustering results we use external evaluation, where
the knowledge of the true labels (or classes) is applied. The external evaluation
measurement we use is V-measure, an aggregate measure which gives a singular
value for the clustering performance. Next, we will give a short introduction to
V-measure, however, we do not go over it in detail, and an interested reader is
suggested to read the original paper by Rosenberg and Hirschberg [28].
V-measure V-measure is a conditional entropy-based external evaluation mea-
sure for clustering [28]. It addresses two important factors that intuitively define
good clustering result: homogeneity and completeness. Homogeneity is satisfied
in a clustering if all clusters contain only data points from a single class. On the
other hand, completeness is satisfied in a clustering if all data points of each class
are in a single cluster. V-measure is then the weighted harmonic mean of the
homogeneity and completeness. Let ai j be the number of data points belonging
to a class ci that are members of a cluster k j, and N be the number of data points.
Then, homogeneity is computed as
homogeneity =
1 if H(C,K) = 01 − H(C|K)H(C) otherwise. (9)
13Recall that the number of different exercises (classes) in the student dataset was five.
44
where
H(C | K) = −
|K|∑
k=1
|C|∑
c=1
ack
N
log
ack∑|C|
c=1 ack
, and
H(C) = −
|C|∑
c=1
∑|K|
k=1 ack
N
log
∑|K|
k=1 ack
N
.
Similarly, completeness is computed as
completeness =
1 if H(K,C) = 01 − H(K|C)H(K) otherwise. (10)
where
H(K | C) = −
|C|∑
c=1
|K|∑
k=1
ack
N
log
ack∑|K|
k=1 ack
, and
H(K) = −
|K|∑
k=1
∑|C|
c=1 ack
N
log
∑|C|
c=1 ack
N
.
V-measure is now defined as
Vβ =
(1 + β) × homogeneity × completeness
(β × homogeneity) + completeness ,
where β is a weighting factor. If β > 1, then completeness is weighter over
homogeneity, and if β < 1 then homogeneity is weighted more strongly. We use
β = 1 to give completeness and homogeneity the same weight.
Because of the normalizing factors H(C) and H(K) in Eq. 9 and Eq. 10, all the
measures are invariant with respect to the number of classes in the dataset and
the number of clusters. In addition, V-measure does not require a post-processing
step where each cluster is assigned to a class, like many other measures that
evaluate clustering performance [28]. This makes it an especially good clustering
measurement, as it does not include in its evaluation how clusters are assigned to
classes, which might be based on vague premises.
The computed homogeneity, completeness and V-measure scores for different
clusterings for the datasets are shown in Table 3. For the malware dataset we can
observe that all the clusterings perform on the same level, but both the (2, 3)-grams
and (1, 0)-grams are slightly better in performance than the clustering done from
the GED approximations. However, the differences are so neglible that the overall
winner in performance is left undecided.
The difference of performance in the student dataset is larger between (2, 3)-
grams and (1, 0)-grams. Surprisinly (1, 0)-grams perform better than (2, 3)-grams,
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but closer inspection reveals that this is mainly due to the optimal clustering
amount, determined by the maximal silhouette value, is larger for the (1, 0)-grams.
Larger number of clusters almost guarantees that the homogeneity of the clusters is
higher. Overall the student dataset is not so well clustered as the malware dataset,
but this was expected as the students are supposed to design their programs on
their own, not modify existing programs.
The malware dataset The student dataset
GED (2, 3)-grams (1, 0)-grams (2, 3)-grams (1, 0)-grams
Clusters 21 23 23 4 10
k-nn 13 13 13 13 13
Homogeneity 0.7726 0.7983 0.7941 0.4340 0.6821
Completeness 0.7707 0.7779 0.7726 0.5404 0.5066
V-measure 0.7717 0.7880 0.7832 0.4814 0.5814
Table 3: The clustering parameters and the results for the datasets. Only the
malware dataset is compared against the GED approximation.
8 Discussion
Having the experiment results we will now discuss about the results and some
factors that might affect them. The discussed topics are not in any particular order.
The malware dataset The results for the malware dataset are a bit surprising
as (1, 0)-grams perform nearly identically to (2, 3)-grams. Some explanation for
this can be found if we look back at the Figure 12 on page 32. The figure shows
us the fraction of matching non-local functions (i.e. the functions have the same
name) between the malware variants. We observe immediately, that the fraction
is generally higher inside the family than between variants of different families.
From this observation, we draw two possible hypotheses for the cause: (1) the
malware publishing groups and the automatic code obfuscators do not alter the
non-local function calls so much, and (2) malware variants are often classified by
analysts to families based on the vulnerabilities they exploit (e.g. calling some
non-local function raises a possiblity for a buffer overflow that gives the malware
an access to other parts of the system).
The above mentioned two hypotheses are of course related. If a certain malware
variant aims to attack a known vulnerability in some part of the system, it might
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not be able to change calls that are directly related to the system vulnerability as
freely as it can change calls to other parts of the system, as the vulnerability may
be only exploited with a certain sequence of actions. On the otherhand, as the
analysts are likely aware of these exploits, they tend to group variants that act
similarly (use the same vulnerabilities) to the same families as the family name is
then associated with a known attack sequence.
Other matter is how well the results obtained with (k, d)-grams compare to the
results of GED approximations. On the first sight it seems that the (k, d)-grams do
astonishingly well compared to the more complex GED approximation (Table 2
and Table 3). However, we have to keep in mind that the malware dataset is really
small, and the variants in the dataset have not been chosen with a spesific purpose
to be a fair comparison between the methods. Certainly more experiments with
larger datasets are needed to come to a definite conclusion of how well (k, d)-grams
perform in malware classification and clustering.
The student dataset In the student dataset we had a similar revelation as with
the malware dataset: (1, 0)-grams performed even better than more complex
(2, 3)-grams in retrieval (Figure 15) and clustering (Table 3). The reason behind
this might be twofold. Firstly, as the students are only on their first semester
in the university, most of them are likely novices in programming. During the
programming course they incrementally learn to use new library methods and
code architectures, making the exercise classification easier as library functions are
mainly used after they have been introduced in the course (giving larger set of
possible library functions to the exercises appearing later in the course). Secondly,
some exercises may implicitly require to use some library functions, even though
the assignments are not directly forcing to use them, e.g. random movement of a
game piece needs java.util.Random.
The clustering results of the student dataset seem at first little bit strange as the
(1, 0)-grams have much higher homogeneity score than (2, 3)-grams, which affects
the V-measure. However, this seems to be purely a cause of the optimal number of
clusters determined by the maximal silhouette value. For (1, 0)-grams the optimal
number of clusters was ten and for (2, 3)-grams four. It is almost guaranteed, that
the clusters are more homogeneous when the number of clusters increases14, and
especially if it exceeds the number of true classes. As a comparison we run the
clustering for (2, 3)-grams with ten clusters (other parameters unaltered) resulting
14Given that some of the true class structure is contained in the distance matrix from which the
clustering is computed.
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in homogeneity of 0.7464 and V-measure of 0.6209, which both are better than the
results for (1, 0)-grams.
Speed and quality In our experiments we observed, that k > 2 did not give us
better performance, but the increase in the generated features and in the runtime
was exponential. With an assumption that the generated feature set grows faster the
larger the dataset is, w.r.t k and d, we could say that mining more than (2, d)-grams
is not reasonable. This would make the whole mining algorithm more streamlined,
as the main algorithm for generating (k, d)-grams described in Algorithm 1 on
page 25 would be stopped at line 6.
Pruning and weighting When increasing k we generate exponentially more
potential feature candidates, a fraction of which are only present in one malware
variant. This has a negative effect on distance computation between feature sets as
a feature that is present in only one variant does not capture similarity between
any two variants, and might only produce more noise to the distance computation.
Pruning can reduce the above mentioned problem, but it means that all the
features in all the variants have to be taken into account, which can be time and
space consuming in a large dataset. On the other hand, our feature weighting
addresses the same problem from another point of view: the larger the k the
smaller weights its features can have. Again, we need to know the number of all
features for each k before we can weight them. As we have our best performance
with both options turned on, it could be worthwhile to look into this matter more
closely, and develop a feature set distance computation that inherently addresses
these problems.
Reproducibility and overfitting The datasets we use to evaluate (k, d)-grams
are small, and especiallly the malware dataset is tiny compared to the amount of
malware variants found in the wild. Furthermore, we have mostly selected our
methods by tweaking the parameters to give the best performance for our datasets.
In effect, we need more experiments on larger datasets to evaluate how well the
(k, d)-grams perform, and how do the values k and d affect the results on a larger
scale.
However, comparing to the performance of GED approximation and baseline
method (non-local function sets) we can see that the method gives comparable
results. Also, as we get very similar results with many different parameter settings
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(different k and d), we can say that our the (k, d)-grams are quite robust on how the
parameter values are chosen.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed structurally oriented call graph features, d-reachable k-grams,
and discussed about their proterties and limits. For the features we have given an
algorithm that mines from a call graph all the features up to a certain k and d, and
named these feature sets as (k, d)-grams. Using the (k, d)-grams we have defined
a distance measure between two call graphs and given several ways to compute
the actual values for the features based on the call graph they are generated from.
We have experimented with the (k, d)-grams using two datasets and have shown
that the features perform relatively well in information retrieval and clustering
tasks. Moreover, the (k, d)-grams perform in our experiments on a level similar to
the more complex GED approximation for one of the datasets. However, more
experiments are needed to evaluate their performance on larger datasets.
Even though our proposed features might fall short when using larger datasets,
they have some advantages over the GED approximations. Foremost, the costly
GED approximation has to be done to each call graph pair separately, which
makes it even more costly on larger datasets, wheras the call graph features can
be generated from each call graph individually, and the distance measure can
be computed efficiently over the generated feature sets. This makes the features
suitable candidates for a similar system design as was done by Hu et al. [12]. The
generated feature sets could be used in the first layer to efficiently compare a given
malware variant to a large set of possible variants or their prototypical feature sets.
Then, based on the decisions made in the first layer, the malware variant would be
compared to a limited set of variants using GED approximation in order to find a
small set of most similar variants from the whole database.
As a future work, in order to make the (k, d)-grams truly efficient in a larger
scale, at least one issue needs to be addressed: how well (k, d)-grams that are not
pruned and weighted handle large databases. If the performance drop without
pruning and weighting is similar as with the small datasets, there is no issue, but
if it is noticeably larger, we need to either come up with a distance measure that
inherently takes pruning and weighting into account or make an efficient indexing
scheme where the weights and features to prune are consistent across the whole
database and are both efficiently accessable and alterable.
All in all, further research on behavior of d-reachable k-grams seems to be an
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interesting future path to take, e.g. to see how well feature selection techniques
could be applied to them in order to reduce the noise in the feature set.
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